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REDEFINING THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
STATE SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
A principal purpose for the creation of our system of consti-
tutional federalism was to vest in a national government the au-
thority to regulate commerce among the states and thereby to
avoid the inconsistent pattern of regulation imposed by competing
states under the Articles of Confederation.' For this reason, the
Constitution gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce...
among the several states .. ,, 2 The federal judiciary has con-
tinually monitored the expansion of congressional authority under
the commerce clause; it has upheld regulation of even primarily
local activities if they have an economic impact in more than one
state.$
In September 1980, however, in United Transportation Union
v. Long Island Rail Road (LIRR),4 the Second Circuit announced
a decision that could pose a significant threat to congressional power
under the commerce clause. The court held the federal Railway
Labor Act (RLA) 5 unconstitutional as applied to employees of the
state-owned Long Island Rail Road (Railroad).6 As a result, employ-
ees of the railroad were denied the protection of the right-to-strike
I In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall explained "[tihe power over
commerce . . . was one of the primary objects for which the people of America
adopted their government. . . ." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). See H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949); Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446 (1827); Tim FxnxuiiAST Nos. 6, 7, 11, 22 (A.
Hamilton). See also G. GuNrmn, CASES ANDM MA -RmAS ON CONsTrrTIoNAL LAW
113 (10th ed. 1980); 1 B. ScHwAR=z, Tbm Powxns oF GovmwmEN 178 (1963);
2 J. STORY, Co i!wTAums o Ti" CONSTITUTION 2-3 (5th ed. 1891).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause was designed to suppress
the "interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some states [because] ... if not
restrained by a national control [these regulations would prove to be] . . . serious
sources of animosity and discord .... " THE FEnmx jsT No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
a For examples of the reach of the commerce clause into primarily local
activities, see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (upholding federal
legislation prohibiting druggists from relabeling pills that had been shipped under
correct label in interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942)
(upholding federal farm production quota as applied to small dairy farm, extending
to "production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption
on the farm.").
4634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 22,
1981) (No. 80-1925).
5 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 111 infra.
6 634 F.2d at 20. See text accompanying notes 99-103 infra.
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provisions of the RLA 7 and were enjoined from striking under the
New York State Taylor Law.8
The LIRR decision was based on the state sovereignty doctrine
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1976 in National League of
Cities v. Usery (NLC).9 Under this doctrine, federal legislation,
,even if valid as applied to private commercial activity, is uncon-
stitutional insofar as it "directly displace[s] the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions .. . ." 'o The Second Circuit's application of the NLC
state sovereignty doctrine to the state-owned Railroad relied in part
on a reading of NLC advanced by constitutional law scholars Frank
Michelman and Laurence Tribe."
In essence, the Michelman-Tribe interpretation.12 of NLC
rejects the notion that states have any inherent rights under the
Constitution. Instead, the states' right to challenge the constitu-
tionality of federal legislation is derived from the rights of private
individuals to receive basic social services. The Second Circuit
implemented this theory by characterizing the Railroad's passenger
service as a basic social service.13 The right-to-strike provisions of
the federal RLA were invalidated, therefore, in order to protect the
individual rights of the recipients of the railroad service.
The LIRR decision raises the possibility that the NLC state
sovereignty doctrine will be used to undermine valid congressional
efforts to regulate interstate commerce. The unintended conse-
quence of the Michelman-Tribe theory has been to broaden the po-
tential application of the state sovereignty doctrine, because the inte-
gral and traditional governmental functions identified by the Court
in NLC may be interpreted now to include any basic social service
provided by a state. Especially as interpreted by the Second Circuit
745 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). "Although not explicitly set
forth in the RLA, the parties may resort to self-help once the RLA's procedures
designed to induce agreement have been exhausted." 634 F.2d at 20 n.2 (citation
omitted).
8 N.Y. Civ. SEsv. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1980).
9 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10 Id. 852. In NLC, the terms "integral" and "traditional" are used together
to describe the state governmental activities that come under the state sovereignty
doctrine. Id. 852, 855. See LIRR, 634 F.2d at 25 n.16; Michelman, States" Rights
,and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YAm L.J. 1165, 1172 n.28 (1977).
11 634 F.2d at 25 n.15. See Michelman, supra note 10; Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Governmental Services, 90 HAnv. L. REv. 1065 (1977); text accompanying note 103
infra.
12See note 85 and text accompanying notes 83-91 infra.
13 634 F.2d at 26.
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in LIRR, therefore, the state sovereignty doctrine could permit a
state to frustrate a whole range of federal legislation simply by
assuming ownership of a new service operation.
This Comment is a response to the potentially unbridled
state sovereignty doctrine heralded by the LIRR decision. The ap-
plication of NLC's state sovereignty doctrine must be limited to
ensure that states cannot unduly frustrate congressional authority
under the commerce power. This Comment, therefore, advances a
political process analysis of the state sovereignty doctrine that pro-
vides such a limit. The analysis rejects interpretations of NLC
that acknowledge constitutional rights in either states or individuals.
Instead, the process analysis views the Court's role in NLC as one
of policing the political accountability of Congress and of assuring
that Congress not be permitted to regulate activities when it is in-
stitutionally insensitive to the costs of compliance. The judiciary's
role, therefore, is to identify this class of activities and to deny con-
gressional authority to regulate them under the commerce power.
I. THE MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE STATE
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court first suggested the broad scope of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause in the venerable case
Gibbons v. Ogden,14 in which Chief Justice Marshall announced
with characteristic expansiveness that Congress's "plenary" power
over commerce reaches all "commerce which concerns more states
than one." "I According to Chief Justice Marshall, the commerce
power "may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." 16
Mostly dicta,17 his views of the breadth of the commerce power
have never been exceeded.'
8
Despite the Marshall Court's receptivity to broad exercise of
the commerce clause, Congress declined to engage in large-scale
14 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15 Id. 194.
16 Id. 196.
17 The actual holding in Gibbons was quite narrow. A steamboat monopoly,
granted by New York State and operating between New York and New Jersey, was
invalidated because it conflicted with a federal licensing statute. The consti-
tutionality of the federal statute was upheld under the commerce clause. Id.
18 For other statements by the Marshall Court on the breadth of the commerce
clause, see Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446 (1827) (Marshall,
C.J.); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324-26 (1816) (Story, J.).
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regulatory activity until the late nineteenth century.'9 By that
time, however, the Court had grown less solicitous of congressional
power. In cases such as United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,20 for
example, the Court demonstrated its restrictive approach to con-
gressional regulation of private commercial activity.2' Even into
the early 1930s, the same narrow reading of the commerce clause
frustrated major pieces of President Roosevelt's New Deal legisla-
tion.m The Court's view at that time was that the tenth amend-
ment's reservation of powers to the states placed a limit on the
reach of Congress's commerce power.2
Finally, however, acceding perhaps to the sentiment exempli-
fied by President Roosevelt's court-packing plan,24 the Court re-
jected a tenth amendment challenge to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1935 25 in NLRB v. Jones 6 Laughlin Steel Corp.26
1
9 The first large-scale regulatory acts were the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1976 & Supp.
11 1979)), and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). These early national regulatory
schemes represented congressional responses to the needs of a new, national economy
made possible by the development of transportation, industrialization, and com-
munication. See generally G. GuNm, supra note 1, at 133.
20 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
21 In Knight, the Court struck down the government's attempt, under the Sher-
man Act, to break up a corporate acquisition that gave a single manufacturer control
of over 98% of America's sugar refineries. In its analysis of the commerce power's
breadth, the Court drew a distinction between direct and indirect effects on com-
merce; it held that because manufacturing affected commerce only indirectly, the
commerce power did not authorize congressional regulation of manufacturing. See
also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down statute prohibiting
interstate commerce in the products of child labor); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a federal "yellow dog" contract restriction).
22 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(National Industrial Recovery Act).
23 Writing for the Court in Schechter Poultry, Chief Justice Hughes expressed
the fear of an overbroad interpretation of the commerce clause:
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and trans-
actions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate
commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities
of the people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns
would exist only by sufferance of the federal government.
295 U.S. at 546.
2 4 See generally R. JAcKsoN, THE SRUGGrLE FOR JunicLr. SUPREMACY: A S~ruy
OF A Cussis IN AmmuAN PowEa Poarrcs 176-96 (1941); Stem, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HAnv. L. REy. 645, 645-93 (pt. 1),
883-947 (pt. 2) (1946).
25 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979)).
26301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court held that Congress could regulate labor re-
lations at any manufacturing plant selling its products across state lines because a
work stoppage at any such plant "would have a most serious effect upon interstate
commerce." Id. 41.
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-Following Jones 6- Laughlin, which signalled the Court's return
to a more expansive reading of the commerce clause, the Court
consistently rejected tenth amendment attacks on congressional
regulation of private commercial activity.2 7  United States v.
Darby,28 decided in 1941, upheld minimum-wage, maximum-hour
regulations regarding the production of goods for interstate com-
merce 29 and ended (at least for the time being) 80 the tenth amend-
ment's use as an independent limitation on the commerce power.
A unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Stone, declared that
"[t]he [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered." 31 Since Darby, congressional
action under the commerce clause as applied to private commercial
activity has been free of tenth amendment encumbrances. All Con-
gress need show is that it has a "rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce," 32 and
the legislation falls within the scope of the commerce power.
33
The- law regarding congressional regulation of state and local
governmental activities, however, has not followed the same path.
The Court initially refused to distinguish, for the purpose of de-
termining the validity of commerce clause legislation, between state
governmental activity and private commercial activity. Accordingly,
in the first major case testing the constitutionality of congressional
regulation of a state activity, a unanimous Court in United States
v. California 34 upheld the application of federal safety regulations
2 7 E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533 (1939);
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
28312 U.S. 100 (1941).
29 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1978 & Supp. III 1979)). The original version of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covered only employees of private industry. Congress
extended the FLSA's coverage to all state employees in 1974, thus precipitating
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Fair Labor Standards
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 58 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §203(e) (1976)).
80 That is, until the decision in National League of Cities. See notes 54-71
infra & accompanying text.
31312 U.S. at 124.
82 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). Accord, Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 258, 262 (1964). See generally L. ThB, AmmucAN CONSTrTruorNAL
L~w § 5-5 (1978).
33 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304. Of course, the commerce power is constrained
by other, non-tenth amendment, constitutional limitations. E.g., United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (sixth amendment); Mabee v. White Plains Publish-
ing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (first amendment).
34297 U.S. 175 (1936). Accord, Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
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to a state-owned freight railroad. 5 The Court declared that a "state
can no more deny [Congress's power to regulate commerce] than
can an individual." 81 Consistent with Darby, the Court recognized
no affirmative limitations on federal power in the reservation of
state powers by the tenth amendment: "The sovereign power of
the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of
power to the federal government .... 37
Although subsequent cases,"8 relying on California, also ap-
proved Congress's use of the commerce power to regulate state
governmental activity, the Court in the late 1960s indicated a re-
newed interest in principles of state sovereignty. In Maryland v.
Wirtz,39 the Court declared that the courts have "ample power to
prevent... 'the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign political
entity' "40 even as it upheld the application of the federal minimum-
wage law to employees of state-owned schools and hospitals.41
Justice Douglas's dissent, however, argued for greater solicitude for
state sovereignty interests.42  He characterized the regulation of
state governmental activity, unlike the similar regulation of pri-
vate commercial activity, as an "invasion of state sovereignty pro-
tected by the Tenth Amendment that is in my view not consistent
with our constitutional federalism." 4
3
35 297 U.S. at 186.
3a 297 U.S. at 185. The language of the tenth amendment ostensibly speaks to
states and individuals as equals: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
37 297 U.S. at 184. This position seemingly foreclosed the states from erecting a
barrier against congressional action.
8 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353
U.S. 553 (1957).
39392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
40 d. 196. The majority in Wirtz, however, held California controlling, Id.
198.
The Supreme Court has long asserted that the Constitution guarantees the
continued existence of the states as sovereign political units. See, e.g., Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) ("neither government may destroy the
other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers"); Texas v.
Wute, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) ("It]he Constitution, in all provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States"); Lane County
v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("in many articles of the Constitution
the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the inde-
pendent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized").
41392 U.S. at 193-99.
42 392 U.S. at 201-05. Wirtz was a 6-2 decision. Justice Stewart joined Justice
Douglass dissent.
43 392 U.S. at 201.
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Justice Douglas's concern that the federal government could
use the commerce clause to "devour the essentials of state sover-
eignty" 44 was echoed by the Court in Fry v. United States.45 Up-
holding under the commerce clause the constitutionality of tem-
porary federal wage controls on state employees,46 the Court
nevertheless stated that "[t]he [tenth] Amendment expressly declares
the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
effectively in a federal system." 47 Fry thus increased the likelihood
that the tenth amendment might be used as an affirmative limitation
on Congress's commerce power as applied to state governmental
activity.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, added support to the tenth
amendment protection suggested by the majority,48 providing the
first articulation of the modern state sovereignty doctrine. In
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, a state, unlike an individual, can
assert an "affirmative constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as
a State, to be free from ...congressionally asserted authority." 49
According to Justice Rehniquist, both the tenth and eleventh
amendments demonstrate that Congress is "not free to deal with a
State as if it were just another individual or business enterprise
subject to regulation." 50
441d. 205.
45 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
46Id. 548. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment
barred district court order requiring state to pay retroactive benefits to aged, blind,
and disabled plaintiffs); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (comity,
equity, and federalism precluded federal injunction against state criminal prosecu-
tion); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-26 (1970) (held unconstitutional con-
gressional legislation lowering the voting age to eighteen in all state elections; the
federal action usurped a uniquely state function that the Constitution impliedly
reserved to the states) (opinion of Justice Black announcing the judgment of the
Court).
For a more comprehensive examination of the Supreme Court's heightened
sensitivity to state sovereignty interests in the 1970s, see generally Note, Municipal
Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HAnv. L. REv.
1871, 1873-76 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities Issuers: Applying the Test of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 998-1000 (1976).
47421 U.S. at 547 n.7. "While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized
as a 'truism' . . . it is not without significance." Id.
48 Id. 549.
49 Id. 553. Justice Rehnquist found the source of this state power "solely [in]
a concept of constitutional federalism." Id. 554.
5old. 557. Justice Rehnquist cited Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), to
support the proposition that the Constitution's framers conferred upon the states
attributes of sovereignty apart from the specific provisions of the tenth and eleventh
amendments.
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Having placed state sovereignty on tenth amendment grounds,
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that it nevertheless would be neces-
sary to draw a line between state functions protected by state sover-
eignty and those activities properly subject to congressional regula-
tion.5' By way of example, he reasoned that the state-owned
railroad in California was not "sufficiently closely allied with tradi-
tional state functions" 52 to deserve constitutional protection. On
the other hand, the state-owned schools and hospitals in Wirtz
qualified as protected state functions. 3
In 1976, a plurality of four, with the separate concurrence of
Justice Blackmun, adopted the reasoning of Justice Rehnquist's Fry
dissent in NLC.54 Expressly overruling Wirtz, 5 the Court held
unconstitutional the 1974 legislation extending federal minimum-
wage and maximum-hour provisions to nearly all state employees. 58
The offending legislation was declared unconstitutional to the ex-
tent that it "displace[d] the States' abilities to structure employer-
employee relationships" 57 in areas of "integral" 58 and "tradi-
tional" 19 state and local governmental functions. 60
51 Id. 558 n.2.
52 Id. 558.
53 Id. Although he agreed with the result reached in California, Justice Rehn-
quist declared that the statement in that case that a "state can no more deny ...
[Congress's plenary power to regulate commerce] than can an individual," was
"demonstrably wrong." Id. 552.
54426 U.S. 833 (1976). Although it overruled Wirtz, the NLC Court affirmed
Fry. The basis for the distinction is not immediately clear, but the Court acknowl-
edged that the federal wage freeze challenged in Fry was temporary and did not
increase the burden on the state's treasury. Id. 853. See text accompanying notes
144-47 infra.
85 426 U.S. at 855.
5 6 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88
Stat. 58 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1976)). The FLSA amendments chal-
lenged in NLC were additions to the same act held constitutional in Darby. See
notes 28-31 supra & accompanying text. The original FLSA, as enacted in 1938,
specifically excluded the states and their political subdivisions from its coverage.
Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
The NLC Court, finding that state sovereignty operated as an affirmative con-
stitutional prohibition, rendered its holding consistent with Darby, in which the
Court stated: "Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which
do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power con-
ferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." 312 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
57 426 U.S. at 851. See id. 847.
58 Id. 851, 852,854 n.18, 855.
59 Id. 851, 852, 855.
60 Although the language of the tenth amendment directly addresses only the
"States" and the "people," the Court in NLC applied the state sovereignty doctrine
to local "political subdivisions" of states because they "derive their authority and
power from their respective States." Id. 855-56 n.20.
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The Court first recognized that the legislation was unquestion-
ably within Congress's commerce power and valid as applied to
private commercial activity. As applied to "States qua States," 61
however, the legislation encountered the "constitutional barrier" 62
of state sovereignty. Justice Rehnquist, writing the plurality
opinion, stated:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress
may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to
reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits
it from exercising the authority in that matter.
63
The case, therefore, was remanded for the district court to de-
termine which of the affected state governmental activities fell
within the protected area of integral and traditional governmental
functions and therefore were outside Congress's power to regulate
under the commerce clause.6 Thus, for the first time since the
1980s, the Court held unconstitutional a congressional exercise of
the commerce power."
Justice Blackmun, casting the "pivotal" 66 fifth vote, submitted
a separate concurrence joining the Court's opinion with the under-
standing that the Court was adopting a balancing approach. Ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun, when the federal interest in commer-
cial regulation is "demonstrably greater" than the impact on the
state function, state compliance with the federal law would be
"essential." 67
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White
and Marshall, attacked the plurality opinion as "an abstraction
without substance." 68 Justice Brennan denied that a state sover-
eignty doctrine placing states on different grounds from individuals
61 Id. 847.
62 Id. 841. The Court reserved opinion whether the state sovereignty doctrine
applied to other sections of the Constitution, such as the spending power. Id.
852 n.17.
63 Id. 845.
64 Id. 856. For the NLC decision after remand, see National League of Cities
v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703, 705-07 (D.D.C. 1977).
65 The most recent Supreme Court case to invalidate federal legislation enacted
under the commerce power bad been Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1938). See notes 19-23 supra & accompanying text.
66 See LIRR, 634 F.2d at 24 (quoting State Dep't of Transp. v. United States,
430 F. Supp. 823, 825 (N.D. Ga. 1976)).
67 NLC, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
6s426 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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existed anywhere in the Constitution." He criticized the Court for
repudiating the "principles governing judicial interpretation of our
Constitution settled since the time of Mr. Chief Justice John
Marshall, [by] discarding his postulate that the Constitution con-
templates that restraints upon exercise by Congress of its plenary
commerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial
process." 70
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, indicated that he could
not adopt the majority's reasoning without appropriate restraints
on its application. He stated: "Since I am unable to identify a
limitation on [the commerce power] that would not also invalidate
federal regulations of state activities that I consider unquestionably
permissible, I am persuaded that this statute is valid." 71
II. Post NLC: THE AMBIGUITY AND IMPROVIDENCE OF THE
STATE SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
A distinct danger inheres in the ambiguous definition of the
state sovereignty doctrine provided by the Supreme Court in NLC.
Without restraints, this doctrine can be used by particular interests
to frustrate otherwise valid federal regulatory schemes to the detri-
ment of the intended beneficiaries of the federal regulation. The
NLC state sovereignty doctrine presents this problem because, to
date, judges and scholars have not succeeded in identifying precisely
the doctrine's constitutional basis or its ultimate political rationale.
A close examination of the NLC opinion, recent scholarship,
and relevant principles of democratic political theory will be under-
taken in an effort to identify more precisely the constitutional
foundations of the state sovereignty doctrine. The objective is to
construct an understanding of the doctrine that will both explain
and limit its application, thereby precluding frustration of Con-
gress's constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce.
Most notably absent from the NLC opinion is a standard per-
mitting identification of those "integral" and "traditional" state
governmental activities that should be protected from federal intru-
sion. In his dissent in Fry v. United States,72 Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that some doctrinal line would have to be drawn and
69 Id.
70 Id. 857.
71 Id. 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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suggested some tests that might prove useful; 73 the Court in NLC,
however, adopted no test or rationale. Instead, it provided a short
list of state and local governmental activities that deserve state
sovereignty protection.74 Although it admitted that this list is
"not... exhaustive," 75 the Court afforded little guidance in identi-
fying other activities that might deserve protection.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in NLC 71 compounds
the ambiguity of the state sovereignty doctrine. 77 Justice Blackmun
conditioned his crucial fifth vote on his understanding that the
Court's opinion involved a balancing approach, ensuring that the
judiciary would not invalidate federal legislation in which the
federal interest is "demonstrably greater" and state compliance
with federal standards would be "essential." 78 Because the Court's
opinion implicitly rejected a balancing approach,79 the authority of
such an approach remains unclear. Some lower federal courts have
adopted balancing tests; s0 others have failed to weigh federal
interests.8 '
73 Id. 558 & n.2. Justice Rehnquist suggested, without deciding the question,
that "the traditional distinction between 'governmentar and 'proprietary' activities
might in some form prove useful in such line drawing. The distinction suggested
in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), between activities traditionally
undertaken by the State and other activities, might also be of service .... " Id.
558 n.2. The Court did not discuss either of these tests in NLC.
74 For example, "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation." 426 U.S. at 851.
75 Id. 851 n.16.
76 Id. 856.
77 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206
(M.D. Tenn. 1979) ("[s]ince Justice Blackmun's concurrence was the swing vote in
the ultimate holding [in NLC], it is impossible to discern what test, if any, was
established for analyzing congressional exercises of power pursuant to the Commerce
Clause").
78 426 U.S. at 856.
79 The Court did not discuss the nature or the importance of the federal interests
involved. Moreover, the Court declared: "We do not believe particularized assess-
ments of [the] actual impact [of the amendments] are crucial .... ." 426 U.S. at
851. Instead, the Court based its holding on the finding that application of the
amendments would "significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships" in areas of integral and traditional governmental
functions. Id. See generally Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Foot-
note to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 Auz.
ST. L.J. 35, 71 n.193; Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law
of Federal jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1301, 1338, 1340 (1978).
80 See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 634 F.2d 19 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-1925);
Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977); Usery v. Bd. of Education, 421
F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
81 See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978); Virginia Surface Mining and
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Although it eschewed an explicit test, the Court did provide
useful guidance by reaffirming its decision in United States v. Cali-
fornia,2 which held that a state-owned railroad is not an activity
embraced by the state sovereignty doctrine.8 3  The Court in NLC
distinguished public railroad service from police departments be-
cause railroad services are "not in an area that the States have re-
garded as integral parts of their governmental activities." 84 This
distinction, however, does not explain adequately the intended reach
of NLC's state sovereignty doctrine. The "integral" and "tradi-
tional" language itself does not provide a principled basis for dis-
tinguishing between police departments and railroads. Absent a
standard for making this distinction, how is a court to determine
whether a given state-owned activity is more like a police depart-
ment or a railroad?
Two leading constitutional law scholars, Frank Michelman 85
and Laurence Tribe,8 6 have addressed precisely this shortcoming
in the NLC opinion; taken together,8 7 they have advanced a novel
interpretation of NLC that, admittedly, "leads in directions the
Justices do not seem to have intended or anticipated." 88 The
Michelman-Tribe theory identifies "individual rights against the
government for certain basic services" s9 as the only supportable
constitutional foundation for NLC's state sovereignty doctrine. The
essence of their interpretation is that " 'states as states' under the
Constitution are imbued with affirmative duties towards their citi-
zens," 1o and that "the Constitution . . . protects citizens against
ill-conceived congressional interference with the states' performance
Reclaimation Ass'n Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980); Tennessee
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
82297 U.S. 175 (1936). See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
83 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
841d. 854 n.18, 854-55.
&5Michelman, supra note 10.
8G L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 5-22; Tribe, supra note 11.
87 The works of Michelman and Tribe may be treated together and will be re-
ferred to as the Michelman-Tribe theory. As Michelman acknowledged in his
opening footnote: "[o]ur two efforts are to a considerable extent overlapping in
content and perception . . . . [and] took shape in our respective minds simulta-
neously .. . at Harvard Law School .... Neither of us is surprised at the family
likeness in the finished pieces." Michelman, supra note 10, at 1165 n.*. See Tribe,
supra note 11, at 1066 n.8, 1089.
88 Michelman, supra note 10, at 1166. Tribe acknowledged: "I haven't a clue
what [the Justices really intended], but I doubt that the conclusion of this Article
was it." Tribe, supra note 11, at 1066.
89 L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 5-22, at 315. See Michelman, supra note 10, at
1172; Tribe, supra note 11, at 1075, 1076.
90 Michelman, supra note 10, at 1194.
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of that role ... ." 91 Michelman and Tribe claim that NLC could
not have been based on "any inherent rights of states"; 92 instead,
"the state's right against the federal government in such a case is
derivative of the rights of its residents against government." 13
In constructing this interpretation of the state sovereignty doc-
trine, Michelman and Tribe attempted to enlist the logic latent in
the NLC opinion, while remaining faithful to its premises, in an
effort to create a "just constitutional order." 94 Their doctrine
"recognizes under the fifth and fourteenth amendments constitu-
tional rights [for individuals] to decent levels of affirmative govern-
mental protection in meeting the basic human needs of physical
survival and security, health and housing, employment and educa-
cation." 95 Although the minimum level of government service
cannot be determined arbitrarily by the courts, once the state has
decided to provide such a service at a given level, the federal govern-
ment may not regulate it and thereby compel a reduction in the
level of service provided. 96
Michelman and Tribe, however, did not answer adequately the
more pressing issue raised by NLC: how to limit its application.
Although recognizing that "the opinion's broad rhetoric poses the
danger that the decision will be read uncritically as a general vindi-
cation of the autonomy of states and municipalities," 97 the affirma-
tive rights analysis, by looking into the future for "a just constitu-
tional system," fails to address NLC's more immediate threat to our
constitutional structure. The assertion of a state government's
duty to provide essential public services has been used to enlarge,
rather than to limit, the protected areas of integral and traditional
state functions.
The Second Circuit's decision in LIRR 98 illustrates the degree
to which states can rely on the broad rhetoric of the NLG opinion,
assisted by the Michelman-Tribe interpretation, to frustrate con-
gressional exercise of the commerce power. In LIRR, the court
cited Michelman's and Tribe's works in support of its finding that
91 Id. 1186.
92 Tribe, supra note 11, at 1090.
93 Id.
94 Id. 1066.
95 Id. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969);
Tribe, supra note 11, at 1096.
96 Michelman, supra note 10, at 1190-91; Tribe, supra note 11, at 1090.
9T Tribe, supra note 11, at 1069. See L. Ttma, supra note 32, § 5-22, at 309-10.
98 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the state-owned railroad was an "integral governmental function" 99
deserving of the state sovereignty protection announced in NLC.
In addition to its local passenger service, the Railroad engaged in
more than $12.1 million of interstate business annually.100 For pur-
poses of the state sovereignty analysis, however, the court character-
ized it as a "passenger rail service." 101 The court found this service
to be within the area of state governmental functions protected by
NLC and therefore distinguishable from the state-owned freight rail-
road denied state sovereignty protection by the Supreme Court in
United States v. California.0 2 The court, quoting Michelman,
specifically based its holding on the reasoning that "the term 'sover-
eignty' as used in [NLC] has been defined to mean 'the state's role
of providing for the interests of its citizens in receiving important
social services.' " 103
The procedural strategy successfully adopted by New York State
in LIRR will be of interest to all state governments. While LIRR
was pending in the district court, New York State converted the
Railroad, which "historically has considered itself a 'carrier' within
the meaning of the RLA," 104 into a public benefit corporation,
thus making the employees "at least facially subject to [New York's]
Taylor Law" forbidding strikes by public employees.105 Only one
99 Id. 24-25 & n.15.
300 Id. 20,23.
301 Id. 26. The court found that the Railroad is a passenger rail service because
only a relatively small portion of its total revenues, which were estimated at more
than $300 million annually, could be attributed to its freight service. Id. 21. The
Railroad's annual, interstate freight revenue of $12 million, however, considered
alone, would establish it as a Class 11 carrier according to the ICC. See ICC
General Instructions on Classification of Carriers, 49 C.F.R. Part 1201, 1-1(a) (1980).
Hundreds of Class III railroads (those with interstate revenues under $10 million)
are subject to the RLA. See Brief on Behalf of United Transportation Union,
Plaintiff-Appellee and on Behalf of Aiiiicus Curiae at 12, United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954
(U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-1925).
102 634 F.2d at 26. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra. The Court in
NLC also found its holding to be consistent with the result in California. 426 U.S.
at 854 n.18.
103 634 F.2d at 25 n.15 (quoting Michelman, supra note 10, at 1172).
104 634 F.2d at 23. Section 1 of the RLA provides in pertinent part that the
"term 'carrier' includes any .. .carrier by railroad subject to the Interstate Com-
merce Act [ICA] .. . " 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The ICA covers "common
carriers" involved in "[t]he transportation of passengers or property... by railroad
.... [f]rom one State ...to any other State .... 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1976).
Indeed, the Railroad has consistently filed reports required by the ICA; its employees
receive the benefits of the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act, and the Federal Employees Liability Act. 634 F.2d at 23.
Recently, in a decision dealing with another subsidiary of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, the Interstate Commerce Commission noted that the Rail-
road is a carrier subject to the BLA. See 634 F.2d at 23 n.12.
105 634 F.2d at 21.
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day after reincorporating the Railroad, the state withdrew from its
position that the Taylor Law 106 was inapplicable because of federal
preemption; shortly thereafter, it filed an action under the Taylor
Law.107 The applicability of the RLA then was challenged effec-
tively under the NLC state sovereignty doctrine.
By expanding the scope of its governmental activities, New
York State was able to deny railroad employees the protection of
the RLA's right-to-strike provisions. 08 As a result, the state suc-
cessfully used its Taylor Law 109 to enjoin any threat of a strike.
The Railroad has been declared "a necessary physical link with other
railroads in the movement of a heavy volume of interstate
freight ... ." 110 Nonetheless, because the NLC state sovereignty
doctrine lacks effective limits, railroad employees were denied a
federally created right to strike-a right that has been held essen-
tial to the federal labor scheme."'
As NLC's integral and traditional test becomes associated with
the provision of any service by a state, the state sovereignty doctrine
poses a tremendous threat to our federal system. Other states prob-
ably will be quick to adopt the strategy successfully employed by
New York State in LIRR: by assuming full ownership of an activity,
100 N.Y. CiV. SEnv. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1980).
107 634 F.2d at 21 & n.4.
108 The right to strike is not set forth explicitly in the RLA. The Supreme
Court, however, has ruled that the right to resort to self-help is implicit in the
statutory scheme. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v, Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 378 (1969).
100 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1980). Section
210(1) provides: "No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a
strike, and no public employee or employee organization shall cause, instigate,
encourage, or condone a strike."
110 Long Island R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 356,
357 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
11 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
378-82 (1969). The Supreme Court made clear that the right to strike was at the
heart of the federal labor scheme.
[Tihe exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit
self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Acts process.
The disputants' positions in the course of negotiation and mediation, and
their willingness to submit to binding arbitration or abide by the recom-
mendations of a presidential commission, would be seriously affected by
the knowledge that after these proceedings were exhausted a State would,
say, prohibit the employees from striking or prevent the railroad from
taking measures necessary to continue operating in the face of a strike.
Whether the source of this right be found in a particular provision of the
Railway Labor Act or in the scheme as a whole, it is integral to the Act.
State courts may not enjoin a peaceful strike by covered railway employees,
no matter how economically harmful the consequences may be.
Id. 380-85 (citations omitted).
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a state can avoid a whole range of burdensome federal regulations." 2
This fear is not unfounded. The likelihood that states would ex-
pand their range of governmental activities was presaged by Justice
Douglas in a 1946 dissent. The court relied on this dissent in
LIRR: 113
A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it own
and operate a railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as
it does to own and operate bridges, street lights, or a sew-
age disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an
earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension
of state activities may today be deemed indispensable....
[A]ny activity in which a State engages within the limits
of its police power is a legitimate governmental activity.114
The NLC test should be clarified; as Justice Brennan noted in
his NLC dissent, the Court's integral and traditional state govern-
mental function "standard is a meaningless limitation on the Court's
state-sovereinty doctrine .... " 115 The absence of any meaningful
limitation on the application of the doctrine poses a real threat that
states, simply by expanding the scope of their governmental ac-
tivities, may be able to frustrate significantly congressional efforts
to design a consistent pattern of national regulation. This broad
reading of NLC is possible because the opinion itself fails to articu-
late adequately its constitutional foundation and thus its implicit
limitations.
III. A POLITICAL PROCEss ANALYSIS OF THE STATE
SOVEREIGNTY DOGTRINE
Basing its decision in part on the Michelman-Tribe interpreta-
tion of NLC,1" 6 the court in LIRR 117 focused on the importance of
11
2 In his NLC dissent, Justice Brennan warned of just this possibility:
Can the States engage in businesses competing with the private sector and
then come to the courts arguing that withdrawing the employees of those
businesses from the private sector evades the power of the Federal Govern-
ment to regulate commerce? ... No Principle given meaningful content
by my Brethren today precludes the States from doing just that.
426 U.S. at 872-73. Justice Brennan cited Justice Frankfurter's opinion announcing
the judgment of the Court in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
113 634 F.2d at 26.
114 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 591 (1946) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
115 426 U.S. at 871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 See note 11 and text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
117 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-1925).
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the service provided to the Railroad's riders in determining that the
RLA's right-to-strike provisions could not be applied. That analysis
ignores, however, a more fundamental problem: the state's protec-
tion of one group-railroad passengers-correspondingly denies the
RLA's protection to another group-railway laborers. 118 This inevi-
table conflict results because the right-to-strike provisions, by increas-
ing the cost of rail service, also reduce the availability of the rail
service to passengers. 119 The LIRR analysis simply accorded greater
weight to the provision of the service than to the interests of the rail-
way workers as expressed by the RLA. In so doing, the Second Cir-
cuit usurped an essentially legislative function, for it is the legisla-
ture's prerogative to favor one set of interests over a competing set.
As the political process analysis demonstrates, the legislature's pre-
rogative may only be defeated when its process is inherently suspect.
The Supreme Court has never elevated to constitutional status
the right to a minimum level of basic social services; 120 it has
never recognized a constitutional right to a minimum wage. In-
stead, to the extent that such rights exist, they arise by legislative
fiat. In any given legislative forum, the conflicting interests are
reconciled through the process of compromise. With respect to
social services provided by the states, there is a heightened potential
for rights in conflict because the compromise struck at the state
level may be, and often is, different from that struck in Congress.
1 21
This is a wholly predictable consequence of our federal system. The
Constitution, therefore, evincing an awareness of this potential for
11SMichelman and Tribe also ignored this condition because they simply
sanctified one set of individual rights, those of the recipients of the services, at the
expense of the other, those of the laborers.
119The process analysis, as articulated, presumes this simple function of in-
creased costs and decreased service. It is, of course, possible that a state could
respond to an increase in costs by increasing taxes proportionately and thereby
avoiding any decrease in service. This latter relationship does not change the
operation of the process analysis, because an increase in taxes will generate the same
voter dissatisfaction as a corresponding decrease in services. "Increased costs" and
"forced relinquishment of important governmental activities" were a principal con-
cem of the Court in NLC. 426 U.S. at 846-47. See also Michehnan, supra note 10,
at 1174.
120 The Court has specifically denied all claims for "fundamental" treatment of
basic social services under its equal protection analysis. See, e.g., San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (welfare assistance).
Rights the Court has identified as fundamental include interstate travel, Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and privacy in marriage and procreation,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
121 Cf. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925)
(when the federal government "is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce
... the interests of the nation are more important than those of any state").
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conflict, tries to minimize tension by defining the respective powers
of the state and federal governments.12-
Conflicts do arise nonetheless. But when each government is
acting within its defined powers, a conflict between them "is not a
controversy between equals." 123 The supremacy clause unquestion-
ably favors legislation emanating from Congress. 24 Only if Con-
gress is acting outside its affirmative grants of power,125 or if it
encounters an affirmative constitutional limitation,12 may the judi-
ciary invalidate a legislative policy. Underlying state policies there-
fore will prevail. The only checks on the expansion of federal
power that exist are the limits imposed by the Constitution. In-
cluded within these are principles designed to assure the political ac-
countability of Congress.1
2 7
In this context, the Court in NLC attempted to define an area
of state activity constitutionally sheltered from federal power. The
notion of "integral" and "traditional" state functions, however,
is not self-defining; it does not, for example, explain how a state-
owned commuter railway differs constitutionally from a state-owned
freight railroad. Implicit in the Court's analysis is the concern that
Congress may be institutionally insensitive to the impact of its
legislation on certain state governmental activities. Because of
the interposition of state governments between Congress and
the electorate, the normal process of political accountability breaks
down in cases in which the states have assumed substantial respon-
sibility over a certain function.
The states have certain governmental responsibilities that, with-
out the protection of the state sovereignty doctrine, could be seri-
ously frustrated by federal regulation. Accordingly, when federal
regulation prevents the states from providing the kind or level of
services expected by their citizens, the state governments, not Con-
gress, are held responsible. In such cases, Congress is no longer
1'2 The Constitution "conferred certain powers on the state governments, and
certain powers on the national government." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
123 266 U.S. at 425.
124 U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 2.
1
2 5 See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 5-2.
126 See id. 227.
1 2 7 See NLC, 426 U.S. at 875-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("effective restraints on [Congress's exercise of the com-
merce power] ... must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes");
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 197 (1824). See generally THE FmD-
muAks No. 45 (J. Madison); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 CoLuNL L. REv. 543 (1954).
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accountable for the negative political consequences of its actions;
the process generating the legislation, therefore, is inherently sus-
pect. Such a failure in the normal operation of the political process
justifies the invalidation of federal legislation on state sovereignty
grounds.
Concededly, the Supreme Court has never spoken in these terms.
But the Court's concern for the "essential role of the States in our
federal system of government" 128 displays a recognition of the
need to preserve the states' own legislative functions. Being "a co-
ordinate element in the system established .. . for governing our
Federal Union," 129 the states are entitled to a special deference not
given private entities.130 Moreover, that the Court was unwilling to
disturb the way the states had "structure[d]" their service delivery 131
implies that in some areas, because the state legislature, not Congress,
is the politically responsible governmental entity, it should be free
from intrusive federal legislation.
Given the premise that legislative legitimacy flows from po-
litical accountability,132 it follows from the Court's reasoning that
the states may be immune from federal legislation when the state
government, and not Congress, is politically accountable. The
presumption of validity and supremacy usually accorded federal
statutes dissipates when Congress can avoid responsibility for
its decisions. In this context, the NLC state sovereignty doctrine
128 426 U.S. at 844. The recognition of a state sovereignty limitation on Con-
gress's exercise of its otherwise plenary powers is not an entirely new constitutional
principle. Implicit in the tenth amendment's declaration of the relationship between
state and federal powers is the principal that the federal government may not, even
when exercising one of its affirmative grants of power, threaten the "'separate and
independent existence'" of the states. Id. 845. For this proposition, the NLC
Court cited Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868). In Lane
County, the Court acknowledged that "in many articles of the Constiution the
necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent
authority of the States, is distinctly recognized." Id. 76. Accord, Metcalf & Eddy
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725
(1868). The Court in NLC relied on this line of cases as historical, constitutional
support for its state sovereignty doctrine. 426 U.S. at 844-45. Contra, Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.) (Congress "can if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the
full extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause").
129 426 U.S. at 849.
By identifying the state sovereignty limitation as implicit in the tenth amend-
ment and the general federalist structure created by the Constitution, the Court in
NLC rendered its decision consistent with even the broad reading of the commerce
clause offered by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons: "[the commerce] power . . .
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
130 426 U.S. at 845.
131 See id. 847.
132 See text following note 127 supra.
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provides a device the courts can use to allocate decisionmaking
authority for certain kinds of decisions to the appropriate body.
In so doing, the courts ensure that the "correct" substantive deci-
sions are made.
Moreover, the courts are accustomed to this role. Due proc-
ess '3 and voting rights cases, 13 4 among others,135 all attest to the
political policing function undertaken by the courts. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged this crucial judicial function.
In United States v. Carolene Products,136 Justice Stone's famous
footnote four suggested that "legislation which restricts those po-
litical processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny .... ," 137 Although Justice Stone was referring
to the fourteenth amendment, not the tenth amendment, the point
is still clear: the courts are to oversee the smooth running of the
democratic political machine.
138
The NLC Court seems to have been operating under the same
imperative. Its solicitude for the "considered policy choices of the
States' elected officials" 139 belies an underlying rationale aimed
at responsible legislative decisions. Otherwise, there would be no
reason to favor the "considered policy choices" of the states over
those of the federal government. The Court must have been plac-
ing authority in the hands of those who ultimately would be held
politically responsible for the policies in question. The Court's
formulation of the areas for which the states are ultimately account-
,able was the "integral and traditional" test; the services found
clearly to fall under that rubric were police protection, fire pre-
-vention, hospitals, schools, and parks-all areas for which the states
133E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
134 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
135 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
-347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1'3 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
137 d. 152 n.4. See also J. ELY, DEmOCiACY ArN DISTRUST 73-79 (1980).
13
8 Numerous constitutional theorists have asserted that the judiciary is re-
.sponsible for policing the processes of representation guaranteed by the Constitution.
Ely, for example, argues for "a form of [judicial] review that concerns itself with
-how decisions effecting value choices and distributing the resultant costs and benefits
are made." ELY, supra note 137, at 75 n.0 . See generally L. LUs Y, By WHAT
Ricirs? (1975); Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IowA L. BEv.
1059 (1974); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 H nv. L.
.Ituv. 193 (1952).
139 426 U.S. at 848.
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are identified as having primary responsibility.140 Public dissatisfac-
tion resulting from the reduced quality or quantity of a service
would be directed not at Congress but at the state and local govern-
ments considered responsible. Were Congress to create the condi-
tions forcing a curtailment or diminution of such a service, the
federal government would be insulated from the political fallout.
This is precisely the problem the Court seems to have wanted to
avoid in NLC.
The integrity of the states as independent political units de-
pends upon their being free to implement the policies for which
they are primarily responsible. The states, unlike private enter-
prise, cannot shirk their goverernmental responsibilities merely
because the costs become too high. As a practical matter, the states
will provide some level of police protection regardless of the cost.
Severe cost increases are more likely to force the states to abandon
other, less crucial, social services. Respect for the independent
role of state governments in the federal system dictates that the state
legislatures retain control over decisions affecting their ability to
provide services for which they are considered responsible. 141
This political process analysis casts new light on LIRR. The
Second Circuit's emphasis on the "importance" and the "essential"
nature of the service,'4 although initially attractive, was misplaced.
The crucial question is not whether the particular service is "essen-
tial," but rather whether Congress, in enacting the challenged
legislation, was sufficiently accountable to those affected by its action.
If Congress is accountable, then it can be relied upon to weigh the
conflicting interests involved and the legislation must be upheld. In
LIRR, such legislative balancing would have considered the inter-
ests of the railway workers and the competing interests of the re-
cipients of the railway service. The right-to-strike provisions of the
RLA, therefore, reflect the considered policy choice of Congress to
favor the rail workers. Where a showing can be made, however,
that Congress is not accountable for its choices, the courts must in-
validate the federal legislation, and the states' considered policies
will prevail.
140 Id. 851.
1
41 By the same token, however, some decisions are best left to the federal
government. Because of its national constituency and wider perspective, Congress
is presumably more sensitive to the costs, benefits, and variety of interests involved
in certain kinds of legislation. Clearly, Congress is best suited to deal with issues
of national defense; few would argue that this is an area in which the states should
exercise direct control.
142 634 F.2d at 27.
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Under this standard, LIRR was wrongly decided, because the
court failed to focus on Congress's sensitivity to the costs states
would incur in complying with the requirements of the RLA. The
RLA indisputably increased the costs of operating an admittedly
important and essential service. Because the legislation affected
.the private railroad industry as well as public carriers,143 however,
-Congress could not have been unaware of or unaccountable for
those consequences. Congress, therefore, will be held responsible
for fare increases and service curtailments due to the burdens of the
legislation. Such political accountability validates the legislative
.compromise Congress reached in the RLA.
This structural analysis also helps to reconcile the decision in
NLC to uphold Fry v. United States ' 44 but to overturn Maryland
-. Wirtz.145 The Court in NLC emphasized that the federal legis-
lation challenged in Fry-the Economic Stabilization Act-"dis-
placed no state choices as to how governmental operations should
be structured." 146 Instead, the wage freeze "reduce[d] the pres-
sures on state budgets rather than increase[d] them." 147 Thus,
unlike Wirtz and NLC, in which the minimum wage regulations
might have forced a diminution in the level of state services, the
legislation in Fry did not compel a reduction in state services or a
reordering of spending priorities. Fry therefore did not present a
situation in which Congress was insulated from the negative political
.consequences resulting from a forced diminution in the provision
of a state service. The legislation challenged in Fry, therefore, was
.appropriately upheld.
A recent case, difficult to analyze under the NLC standard,
illustrates the application of the political process test.148  In
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,14 the Sixth Circuit held that fire-
fighters 1r0 employed at a municipal airport were part of an "integral
,government function" and therefore not subject to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.'5' The Second Circuit in LIRR, citing Amersbach
14345 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See note 104 supra.
144 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
145 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
146 426 U.S. at 853.
147 Id.
148 See generally Note, National League of Cities Crashes on Takeoff: Balancing
Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEo. LJ. 827 (1980).
'49 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). The court in Amersbach faulted the NLC
,opinion for not having "articulate[d] a specific test to be applied ... .: Id. 1037.
160 Id. 1034 & n.1.
151 Id. 1034.
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as support,152 excluded the railroad's employees from the federal
RLA under the same "integral governmental function" analysis.15
Under the political process test, however, the line defining peculiarly
state functions falls between these two cases: Amersbach was de-
cided correctly; LIRR was not.
The distinction rests on a finding that the political objections
resulting from a railroad strike will be voiced adequately by the
substantial private railroad sector in this nation.154 The electorate
does not necessarily look primarily to the States to provide rail-
road service; 155 the increased costs and interruption in service re-
sulting from the federal regulation implicate simply, according to
the Court in NLC, "the 'shifting economic arrangements' in the
private sector of the economy." 156 Under this test, the Long Island
Rail Road is indistinguishable from the state-owned railroad in
United States v. California,157 to which the Supreme Court, in a
decision approved in NLC, denied state sovereignty rights because
this state service "was not in an area that the States have regarded as
integral parts of their governmental activities." 158
152 634 F.2d at 27.
153 Id.
154 Courts should consider several elements in making such distinctions: the
degree to which the service is commonly provided by states or the private sector,
historical practice, and the involvement of the federal government. Admittedly, this
test closely resembles the integral and traditional test suggested by NLC; deter-
minations in the gray areas, therefore, may remain difficult. By supplying a reasoned
rationale for this question of fact, however, the process analysis will generate a more
consistent and more limited application of the state sovereignty doctrine.
155 See LIRR, 634 F.2d at 27 (noting that "[a]lthough this is a relatively new
development, there now is no reasoned basis for finding that the operation of an
intrastate passenger service ... is any less a governmental function than are sanita-
tion or public parks and recreation").
Peculiar or changed circumstances may enable a court to make a justified finding
to the contrary. The critical question is whether Congress or the state legislature
will be faulted for an insufficient level or quality of service. This flexibility, although
much less than that under the ambiguous NLC doctrine, removes the static element
from the "traditional" component in the NLC test and thereby assures "one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may ...try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New
York State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing. See also F. FAA rirznm=, THE Pnu c AN Ts GOVERNMENT 49-51 (1930).
156 426 U.S. at 849 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
157 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
158 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra. Perhaps
circumstances already have changed to an extent sufficient to sustain, under the
process analysis, the Second Circuit's holding in LIRR on the grounds that: (1) New
York citizens presently look predominantly to the state to provide this railroad
service and (2) the costs to a passenger-commuter line serving a congested corridor
in the nation's largest metropolitan area are so peculiar that the private sector's
objections will not adequately reflect the costs that riders and citizens will incur if a
strike interrupts the service provided by the Railroad. See 634 F.2d at 29-30.
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Unlike state-owned railroads, the service provided in Amers-
bach is not adequately represented in the private sector, for, as the
court found, "[p]rivately-owned airports serving municipalities are
virtually unknown." 19 Those who benefit from municipal air-
ports normally will look to their local legislators with demands or
complaints. Congress, therefore, is likely to be insensitive to mu-
nicipal airports' failures to respond to fires.
The political process interpretation of the NLC state sover-
eignty doctrine will reconcile most of the dissonant concerns ex-
pressed in the three opinions filed in NLC. The plurality will be
accommodated because the "essential governmental functions" de-
serving regulatory autonomy will be protected from federal intru-
sion. The concerns of Justice Blackmun, who was "not untroubled
by certain possible implications of the Court's opinion," 160 will be
resolved, because the new test will involve an implicit balancing
component that will limit the ability of the state sovereignty doc-
trine to frustrate "demonstrably greater" federal interests. 161 Most
importantly, the process interpretation will provide meaning to the
Court's NLC opinion that the dissenters characterized as "an ab-
straction without substance." 162 In so doing, it will curtail the
doctrine's potential to frustrate congressional exercise of the com-
merce power, thereby mitigating many of the fears expressed by
the dissenters.
163
IV. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's broad yet plausible reading of the NLC
state sovereignty doctrine in LIRR and the threat this reading poses
to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce should leave
one, as the NLC opinion left Justice Brennan, "incredulous." 164 An
understanding of this doctrine and its inherent constraints, however,
can assuage such fears. As congressional power expanded to reach a
greater variety of activities, it encountered new affirmative limita-
159 598 F.2d at 1038 & n.7.
160 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101 Id. It is asserted that a demonstrably greater federal interest will heighten
federal legislative accountability.
102 426 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., joined by White, J., and Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
163Justice Blackmun, along with the four dissenters, seemed concerned pri-
marily that an unduly broad reading of the state sovereignty doctrine would frustrate
congressional power. Their concerns, therefore, might be satisfied by an under-
standing of the state sovereignty doctrine that renders it capable of application only
within the bounds proposed by the political process analysis.
164 426 U.S. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tions-limitations either explicit in the Constitution or implicit in
the governmental structure it created. These limitations, however,
as exceptions to Congress's otherwise plenary powers, must be de--
fined narrowly to reach only those activities requiring protection
from federal regulation.
This Comment has advanced a political process analysis that
is intended to guide and limit the application of the NLC state
sovereignty doctrine. The process analysis directs the courts to
invalidate federal regulation of state governmental activities only
when Congress is not politically accountable for the costs associated
with its legislation.
